



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

SUMMARY

OF THE MEETING OF THE

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

Saturday 17 and Sunday 18 November 2018

Ballroom 1
Halifax Convention Centre, Halifax,
Canada

ATTENDANCE LIST

Acting Chairperson	Michael R. Turner (United States)
General Rapporteur	Joseph A. DAY (Canada)
Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation	Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary)
Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities	Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom)
Special Rapporteur	Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany)
President of the NATO PA	Rasa JUKNEVICIENE (Lithuania)
Secretary General of the NATO PA	David HOBBS
Member delegations	
Albania	Xhemal QEFALIA
Belgium	Karolien GROSEMANS Damien THIERY Karl VANLOUWE Veli YÜKSEL Olga ZRIHEN
Bulgaria	Hristo GADZHEV
Canada	Leona ALLESLEV James BEZAN Joseph A. DAY Darren FISHER Cheryl GALLANT Sherry ROMANADO Borys WRZESNEWSKYJ
Croatia	Miro KOVAC
Czech Republic	Tomas CZERNIN Jan FARSKY
Denmark	Jeppe JAKOBSEN
Estonia	Marko MIHKELSON
France	Jean-Jacques BRIDEY Sonia KRIMI Jean-Charles LARSONNEUR Cédric PERRIN
Germany	Lorenz CAFFIER Dagmar FREITAG Jürgen HARDT Wolfgang HELLMICH Thomas HITSCHLER Michaela NOLL

Greece	Gerold OTTEN Karl-Heinz SCHRÖTER Konstantinos BARKAS Andreas LOVERDOS
Hungary	Attila MESTERHAZY Lorinc NACSA
Iceland	Thorgerdur K. GUNNARSDOTTIR
Italy	Massimo CANDURA Luigi IOVINO Andrea Giorgio Felice ORSINI Roberta PINOTTI
Lithuania	Juozas OLEKAS
Luxembourg	Nancy ARENDT KEMP
Montenegro	Obrad Miso STANISIC
Netherlands	Franklin van KAPPEN Sven KOOPMANS Raymond de ROON
Norway	Trond HELLELAND Erlend WIBORG
Poland	Waldemar ANDZEL Czeslaw MROCZEK Marek OPIOLA Marek PEK
Portugal	Joao REBELO Luis VILHENA
Romania	Nicu FALCOI Costel LUPASCU
Slovakia	Anton HRNKO
Spain	Ricardo CORTES Gabino PUCHE
Turkey	Kamil AYDIN Osman Askin BAK Utku CAKIROZER Fikri ISIK Ilhan KESICI
United Kingdom	Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTENWEEM Madeleine MOON John SPELLAR Bob STEWART
United States	Rob BISHOP John BOOZMAN Brett GUTHRIE Rick LARSEN

Associate delegations

Armenia	Koryun NAHAPETYAN
Austria	Michael HAMMER Harald TROCH Maximilian UNTERRAINER

Azerbaijan
Finland

Georgia
Republic of Moldova

Serbia
Switzerland

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*
Ukraine

Malahat IBRAHIMGIZI
Tom PACKALEN
Mikko SAVOLA
Irakli SESIASHVILI
Dumitru DIACOV
Artur RESETNICOV
Dejan RADENKOVIC
Isidor BAUMANN
Alex KUPRECHT
Werner SALZMANN
Vesel MEMEDI
Yurii BEREZA
Iryna FRIZ
Andrii LEVUS
Oksana YURYNETS

Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations

Algeria

Noureddine BENKORTBI
Abdelkader KEMOUNE
Mohammed AZRI

Morocco

European Parliament

Norica NICOLAI
Bogdan ZDROJEWSKI

Parliamentary Observers

Assembly of Kosovo
Kazakhstan

Xhavit HALITI
Nurzhan NURSIPATOV
Abay TASBULATOV
Mohammed S.M. HEGAZI

Palestinian National Council

Parliamentary Guest

Qatar

Dahlan AL-HAMAD

Speakers

James Henry BERGERON, Political Advisor,
Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM)
Dr Peter BROOKES, Senior Fellow for
National Security Affairs, The Heritage
Foundation
Dr Andrea CHARRON, Associate Professor
and Director, Centre for Defence and
Security Studies, University of Manitoba
Dr Peter J. DOMBROWSKI, Professor of
Strategy, US Naval War College
Lieutenant-Colonel Sean FRENCH,
Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, The
Royal Canadian Regiment, Canadian
Armed Forces

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Vice Admiral Andrew L. "Woody" LEWIS,
Commander, US Second Fleet and Joint
Force Command Norfolk

The Honourable Jody THOMAS, Deputy
Minister of National Defence of Canada

International Secretariat

Ethan CORBIN, Director
Jailee RYCHEN, Coordinator
William PERSING, Research Assistant
Milica RADOVIC, Research Assistant

Saturday 17 November 2018

I. Opening remarks by Michael R. TURNER (United States), Acting Chairperson

1. The Chairperson of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC), **Michael R. Turner** (US), welcomed all Committee members and observers to Halifax and thanked the Canadian delegation for hosting the 2018 Annual Session. Mr Turner noted it is not often the NATO PA meets on the North American side of the Atlantic and welcomed the occasion. Chairperson Turner acknowledged Senator John Boozman's (US) attendance, welcoming the sign of commitment from the US Senate to the NATO PA. Additionally, Mr Turner noted the international secretariat's desire to reduce paper consumption, which meant that most session documents were available online. Mr Turner continued by stating the DSC would elect the Committee officers on Sunday, 18 November. He expressed his interest in standing for the chairmanship. He also said Lara Martinho (PT) had expressed her interest in the position of Rapporteur for the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC). An opening remained for Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC). In addition, both Sub-Committees had openings for new vice-chairpersons.

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [167 DSC 18 E]

2. **The draft Agenda [167 DSC 18 E] was adopted.**

III. Adoption of the Summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Warsaw, Poland, on Sunday 27 May 2018 [125 DSC 18 E]

3. **The summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee [125 DSC 18 E] was adopted.**

IV. Procedures for amendments to the draft Resolutions *Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era* [217 DSC 18 E] and *Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East* [218 DSC 18 E]

4. Mr Turner outlined how to amend resolutions, noting all amendments must be submitted in writing, signed and handed to the Committee Secretary no later than 10:30 am that same morning, Saturday 17 November.

V. Consideration of the draft Special Report *Afghanistan: The Nexus of Local and Regional Security* [171 DSC 18 E] by Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany), Special Rapporteur

5. **Wolfgang Hellmich** (DE) presented his report on *Afghanistan: The Nexus of Local and Regional Security*. Mr Hellmich balanced ongoing security sector challenges with broader advancements in the country. He cited Afghanistan's marked improvements in GDP, healthcare, life expectancy, educational institutions, and freedom of the press over the past 17 years. He conceded, however, that lasting peace in Afghanistan remains a complex challenge. Mr Hellmich pointed to the opium trade as a major source of corruption and instability in the region. Last year almost 75% of the world's opium came from Afghanistan with 2018 production surpassing those from the previous year. The National Unity Government and NATO's *Resolute Support Mission* (RSM) have been introducing new initiatives to coordinate counter-corruption efforts across institutions. NATO has partnered with UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to train counter narcotics officers in the region. The

United States has put increased pressure on Pakistan to reform its relationship with Afghanistan. One significant example being the suspension of over USD 2.3 billion in security assistance to Pakistan over the past year. Mr Hellmich highlighted the recent election of Imran Khan as Pakistan's Prime Minister as a possible inflection point, as Mr Khan supports pursuing peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

6. Mr Hellmich then addressed China's role in the region. China is taking a more active role in Afghanistan than ever before as a result of its global "One Belt One Road" Initiative as well as concerns that instability in Afghanistan could foster violent extremism in Western China. Mr Hellmich noted Beijing is considering a plan to open a military base in Afghanistan. Mr Hellmich then noted that Iran's involvement in Afghanistan is also complex and seeks to contain US and ISIL-K (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province) expansion in Afghanistan. For this reason, he continued, Iran has supported the Taliban as a counterweight. Further, tensions between Tehran and Kabul have exacerbated an ongoing dispute over the use of the Helmand River. Referring to the Afghan security environment, Mr Hellmich noted the security situation today continues to undermine prospects for a durable peace. Increased use of guerrilla tactics, he said, has further destabilised the country. Furthermore, high-profile terror attacks in Kabul and across provincial capitals remain at unacceptably high rates. As a result of the increased violence and change of tactics, the Taliban now controls or contests control of the largest amount of territory in Afghanistan since their defeat in 2001. Regrettably, Mr Hellmich continued, the long-awaited parliamentary elections held in October 2018 were plagued with problems. Mr Hellmich argued the only sound way forward is via peace talks between the government, the Taliban, and neighbouring countries. In closing, he suggested inviting young Afghans to NATO parliaments to show how democratic structures work in order to foster greater diplomatic initiatives in the country. Mr Hellmich closed by noting this was the last iteration of his special report on Afghanistan. He thanked everyone for their support and commitment to the report.

7. Michael R. Turner opened the discussion by noting the targeting of narcotics-linked sites in Afghanistan by the Trump Administration. He noted he was encouraged by this new initiative, believing it will have a positive impact on the country's overall security environment.

8. **Kamil Aydin** (TR) argued that even if it is easy to criticise Pakistan, it is important not to alienate Islamabad as an important partner. He recommended looking to increase engagement between NATO and Pakistan. The report should objectively address Pakistan's contribution to *Resolute Support Mission*, he said. He also argued that paragraphs 54-57 should be changed to reflect Pakistan's positive commitment to engage in Afghanistan, if not, he said, they should be deleted entirely.

9. **Lord Campbell of Pittenweem** (UK) drew attention to paragraph 76, which highlights Chinese ambitions in Afghanistan and its emerging engagement in the country, noting its connection to broader Chinese foreign policy objectives. Chinese investment might provide stability for Afghanistan, he said, but Beijing's foreign policy might also work to expand influence outside of China. Lord Campbell asked that this point be considered more.

10. **Joao Rebelo** (PT) requested data on the effectiveness of the current training programmes with the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). Additionally, he inquired about cohesion between tribal and linguistic regions and whether the training missions are really having an impact in this arena. Mr Rebelo also asked how to justify continued international engagement in Afghanistan to local constituents fatigued by the now 17-year old conflict.

11. **Bob Stewart** (UK) began by stating that two days ago, 38 Afghan police and army personnel were killed at an outpost in Farah, Afghanistan. The only way the people can feel secure is if the security forces of Afghanistan are among them – it currently seems as though

the ANDSF are unable to reliably secure a territory and guarantee security for their populations, he said. He asked about Mr Hellmich's opinion on eliminating Taliban fighters and if there was a way to break the cycle of violence.

12. Wolfgang Hellmich raised discussions he had on a recent parliamentary visit to Pakistan as being a source for his report. Mr Hellmich noted he was not in favour of amending paragraphs 54-57, which was recommended by a member of the Turkish Parliament. He argued that criticism must be clear and honest in order for Afghanistan to develop – as such, highlighting the dilemma of Afghan insurgent fighters finding safe haven in Pakistan is important. Mr Hellmich further argued that Chinese foreign policy is Chinese trade policy. In the north of Afghanistan, China is seeking rare earth materials. In this way, Chinese policy can be a useful instrument for development in Afghanistan. However, this could lead to a situation where Afghan infrastructure is owned by the Chinese, such as in Africa. This is something that is concerning and should be explored, he said. Mr Hellmich offered no concrete figures on the training of soldiers in Afghanistan, noting the importance of the question. Regarding the justification of continued international commitment in Afghanistan, he argued it is important to talk to NGOs and civil society to explain to the public the important role NATO is playing in Afghanistan. He had no clear answer on how to stop the cycle of violence, noting that, if he had, he would certainly have relayed it the relevant heads of state and government accordingly. Mr Turner thanked Mr Hellmich for this excellent report and thanked members for their comments. Following the discussion, **the draft report [171 DSC 18 E] was adopted unanimously.**

VI. Presentation by the Honourable Jody THOMAS, Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada, on *Canada, NATO, and Canada's New Defence Policy*

13. **Jody Thomas** expressed gratitude for being invited to discuss Canada's new defence policy. Ms Thomas opened her remarks by noting that NATO remains a cornerstone of Canada's security policy. She highlighted Canada's new defence policy (launched in 2017): Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). *Strong* at home means defending Canada's sovereignty and supporting its armed forces. Three oceans border Canada, she continued, and the country's interior is vast: This means a lot of Canada and not a lot of Canadians to defend it, she said. *Secure* largely underscores Canada's collaboration with the United States on continental defence – primarily through North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). *Engaged* demonstrates Canada's global commitment from Europe to Asia and beyond. Citing a few examples, she noted Canada's leading role in NATO's EFP multinational battalion in Latvia, support for the ongoing KFOR mission, and its vital training mission with Ukrainian security forces. Additionally, she said, Canada is engaged in Mali, South Sudan, Cyprus, Iraq, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo in other multilateral security assistance force missions. Canada takes its global commitments seriously, she said. SSE directs Canadian armed forces to be prepared to simultaneously defend Canada, while meeting commitments to NORAD, NATO, as well as other international institutions. She noted the essential role personnel play in Canada's security policy; a total of 101,500 personnel serve in the Canadian armed forces. Canada set a goal of 25% women in Canadian armed forces by 2026, last year the number had reached nearly 15%. Ms Thomas also said Canada is focusing on the recruitment of other, currently underrepresented minorities. Referring to force structure and capabilities, she said interoperability, cyber security, and innovation are key priorities today.

14. At the conclusion of her presentation, initial questions from Committee members concerned Canada's failure to submit a realistic plan to achieve the Wales Summit defence spending goals to which all Allies committed – 2% GDP dedicated to defence spending, of which at least 20% being allocated to new equipment purchases. Chairman Turner asked about Canada's commitment toward reaching the 2% goal, given its lack of a clear plan. Mr Turner then questioned why Canada had decided to no longer acquire the F-35 joint strike

fighter. He cited several Allies' conclusion that the fighter jet is essential for Allied forces to be fit-for-purpose in today's security environment. He asked what conclusions Allies were to draw about Canada's future security commitments in North America and NATO as a result. Bob Stewart reinforced the point on defence spending by stating there is in fact a uniform standard for assessing defence spending applied to all Allies. He also asked if Canada's defence budget include funds spent on Arctic defence. **Cheryl Gallant** (CA) raised recent recalculations on how Canadian veterans' pensions are measured, which has decreased the reported amount of Canada's defence spending.

15. Jody Thomas replied by stating that Canada has not walked away from the F-35 programme, but rather still had an open competition underway for Canada's new fighter jet requirements. Canada will select the best fighter jet for its commitments to NORAD and NATO, she said. On the question of meeting the 2% benchmark, Ms Thomas said Canada's defence budget has grown by 70%, in recent years, 30% of which has been dedicated to new capital investments. She also underscored Canada's leadership role in a number of Allied operations and missions. She stated that spending on NORAD in Canada's defence spending reporting, noting the budget would grow to 1.4% GDP in the coming years. She noted concern about inconsistencies in how budgets are assessed across the Alliance and argued that such criticism is not fair if different standards are used. In response to Ms Gallant's question she stated she does not work for Veteran's affairs and did not want to comment on the matter as a result.

16. **Rasa Jukneviene** (LT) highlighted her two main priorities as President of the NATO PA had been establishing closer working relationships with NATO's eastern partners and solidifying the Transatlantic bond. Russia remains a challenge, she continued, but also stated it is important to consider what happens after Putin. This might take 20-30 years, but it is important to start now. Ms Jukneviene proposed two initiatives for better longer-term engagement with Russia: engage with the Russian people and increase support for Ukrainian reforms. A successful democratic Ukraine can show the Russian people that democracy can work, she said. She also noted she thought Georgia is ready for NATO membership and hopes Canada will be among the leading countries to support this membership. Jody Thomas replied by noting that Canada has been a leader in supporting democracy and continues to do so.

17. **Juozas Olekas** (LT) asked a question on the eastern and southern flanks and stated that Canada represents a significant border on NATO's northern flank. With increasing Arctic engagements by China and Russia in the Arctic, he asked about Canada's position on the region. **Rick Larsen** (US) noted that the United States has its own challenge to defend its Arctic region and waters, which it will continue to meet. Jody Thomas said she was happy to speak to this issue as a former commissioner of Canada's Coast Guard. Canada is very much engaged in the Arctic, she said, but maintains its official position against military development in the region. Additionally, she stated that climate change is having a major impact on the region.

18. Michael R. Turner responded to the Deputy Minister's comments and stated that when NATO PA is in a nation it asks about domestic policies. Additionally, he corrected Ms Thomas on misperception of NATO policies regarding reporting on national defence spending. He stated that Bob Stewart was correct that NATO reporting of contributions is clearly defined and standard for all Allies. Mr Turner thanked Ms Thomas for her hospitality.

VII. Panel Discussion on *Security in The North Atlantic*:

- **James Henry BERGERON**, Political Advisor, Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) on *The North Atlantic as Part of NATO's 360-degree Maritime Frontier*
- **Vice Admiral Andrew L. "Woody" LEWIS**, Commander, US Second Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk

- **Dr Peter J. DOMBROWSKI, Professor of Strategy, US Naval War College**

19. **James Henry Bergeron** thanked Canada and the NATO PA for its organisation of the meetings in Halifax. Mr Bergeron noted he had just come from NATO's Trident Juncture exercise and then went on to detail MARCOM's responsibilities. Mr Bergeron began his presentation by saying the Atlantic is strategically important for proposes of trade, cyber security, and military defence and its defence is essential to NATO. Reviewing some of the Alliance's history in the Atlantic, he noted the development of maritime exercises over the course of the 20th century. He then shifted to discuss the evolution of Russian activity and threats in the Atlantic. In 2018, new class of ships began joining the Russian fleet, he warned. He argued that rising great power competition is a unifying force among Allies today. Therefore, there needs to be concurrency, deterrence, and defence across the NATO Area of Responsibility (AOR). At the Warsaw Summit, he continued, there was a request for a review of NATO's maritime posture and a subsequent call to strengthen it along with Alliance-wide situational awareness capabilities. As a result, MARCOM has grown from 302 to 485 personnel, but still lacks the depth and assets to be a fulltime operational warfighting commander for any length of time, he said. Allies can and must contribute more assets and personnel in support of the command. In sum, Mr Bergeron said the maritime domain is critical in this 'back to the future' moment for NATO; concerns over deterrence and collective defence directly relate to protecting the sea lines of communication and defending allied freedom of navigation in the waters surrounding and connecting their territories.

20. **Vice Admiral Lewis** began his presentation by stating that the United States released a National Defence Strategy with two main pillars: expanding coalition and ally partnerships; and becoming more capable in its ability to compete with Russia and China. At the same time NATO nations agreed to NATO command structure adaptation. Being a commander of both the US Second Fleet and the new NATO JFC Norfolk, Vice Admiral Lewis noted, allows him to align priorities and concentrate effort. Vice Admiral Lewis noted that United States Secretary of Defence James Mattis told him: "Make sure the fleet is ready to fight, so we don't have to fight." Vice Admiral Lewis noted he expects the Second Fleet to be fully operational and capable in 2019. The establishment and manning of JFC Norfolk would soon follow. Lewis concluded with a few suggestions: each navy should focus on core competencies in key areas: There is room for specialisation, ensuring critical fighting capabilities, as well as deterrence via a strong maritime posture. He noted a better division of labour, both in the EU and on global level, is also essential. He ended by stating that the recently completed Trident Juncture exercise taught NATO important lessons, specifically how to operate in challenging weather, such as wind, cold weather, and rough seas. Alliance efforts to build and hone their forces for better interoperability will allow them to rise to meet the challenges they face.

21. **Dr Peter Dombrowski** began his presentation by stating he was expressing his own personal views and not those of the US Navy. Due to international commerce, he began, seas have become global super highways where nothing is limited to just one region anymore. The North Atlantic specifically connects a vast area. Demand for maritime security and naval sea control can be understood with three V's: It is *vast*, *varied* by geography, and collective defence remains largely *voluntary*. Nations offer what they can and this creates a complex coordination scenario for collective security and defence. Dombrowski went on to list challenges to security in the North Atlantic and the interplay between rising Russian ambitions and US global commitments. Putin has invested in military development and is strengthening submarine warfare capabilities. The United States has vast global commitments and sees the Chinese navy as a major concern. Dr Dombrowski noted he viewed Russia mainly as a land power and highlighted the recent collapse of a dry dock in the High North as a sign of the limits of their efforts to build a modern, capable navy. Dr Dombrowski pointed to Europe's strengths such as high operational competence, excellent classes of frigates and small boats, solid naval industrial base, and reforms currently underway. Some of the best ships in the world come out of Europe, he noted. Europe has a solid industrial base with major reforms in

progress. Also, NATO is reinvigorate following a period of decline at the end of the Cold War, which, he said, will bring significant attention back to maritime capabilities. In conclusion, he recommended substantial new investment by all Allies with a focus on core competences and room for specialisation as important steps in moving forward.

22. **Madeleine Moon** (UK) pointed to a real problem in the United Kingdom around recruitment and the challenge of finding highly capable engineers and seamen - fleets are staying in harbour because of lack of manpower. She asked if there was a major manpower shortage elsewhere in the Alliance. **VAdm Lewis** agreed that the US military is facing many of the same challenges as the UK. He recommended focusing on education to generate an interest in science, technology, engineering, and maths. VAdm Lewis added that he believed the United States was turning the corner in this domain. Mr Bergeron stated that these challenges are common. He cited the cyber domain where the challenges are particularly hard where there is high demand, with a relatively small number of qualified individuals to fill demand. Countries currently do not often have the kind of people getting into the military that can easily fill the demands of a modern force. Dr Dombrowski highlighted a shift in naval training, bringing about increased cooperative training.

23. **Rick Larson** (US) asked about mobility and deployment across the Atlantic in the event of a major contingency. Mr Larson also challenged Mr Bergeron's assertion that "the US Navy is back in the Atlantic", noting it had never left, but that it still was not where it needs to be. Whether the United States gets back to 365-ship navy is still a question, he said. He then asked what area of investment would be when looking for new naval investment. VAdm Lewis said the ability to mobilise assets and personnel across the Atlantic is the identified problem that was driver of the re-established of the US Second Fleet and the new JFC Norfolk. These steps will provide a second manoeuvring arm in the Atlantic, allowing the United States to be forward on the North Eastern side of the Atlantic. In the near future, the Second Fleet will be running exercises in the North Atlantic with a focus on sea lines of communication and choke points in the High North, he added. Mr Bergeron said he understood how his comments could be misinterpreted. What he was referring to, he continued, was US naval presence dedicated to NATO joint maritime activities. A carrier group has been in the area for half the year, he said, which reflects a strong commitment to transatlantic relations. He recommended sending more ships to demonstrate a strong US presence and also to invest more in maintenance. VAdm Lewis stated that US presence goes back to the national defence strategy, which stressed dynamic defence and deployment. This has allowed the United States to have a greater presence in the area. VAdm Lewis argued for more predictable budgets, which are essential for keeping up with maintenance and preventing higher costs in the long run.

24. **Andreas Loverdos** (GR) asked about how concerns in the East related to Russia are being balanced with the significant problems of smuggling, drugs trafficking, and terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea.

25. Cheryl Gallant inquired about new technologies emerging from Russia and China, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and underwater drones and how these will affect the Second Fleet.

26. VAdm Lewis stated that as the Second Fleet gets up and running it will take advantage of new technologies such as AI. A focus on force development and operating concepts is key as well as taking on capabilities and recognising that we are going to fail sometimes. Machine learning and AI can help the Second Fleet achieve situational awareness and thereby make better decisions. Additionally, advancing drone forces can help have an eye toward threat-based issues. Dr Dombrowski urged a little bit of scepticism toward these new technologies. There have been numerous developments that have affected warfare overtime such as submarines and aircraft, he said, but in many ways some things people suspect about AI are likely totally incorrect, he added. There are always challenges with new technology. Sorting out maritime threats and challenges is different from sea to sea. Dr Dombrowski agreed that

resolving North, South, East, West inequities in the Alliance is a difficult political question. He argued that there is room for division of labour and the correct allocation of assets for the tasks at hand. For example, he said, you do not need to send destroyer to intercept migrants. Mr Bergeron stated that NATO operations and missions are very intelligence driven and are having some impact on terrorism and organised crime. When looking at cooperation, coherent political and foreign policy views are essential. However, until cohesion is found on Mediterranean questions, capabilities in the region will remain limited.

27. Mr Turner thanked the speakers and the parliamentarians for their contributions.

VIII. Presentation by Dr Andrea CHARRON, Associate Professor and Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba on *The NATO-NORAD Nexus*

28. **Dr Andrea Charron** began her presentation by noting the importance of understanding the divergence in Canadian and US perceptions of North America. The United States used to see a continent, but she noted she sensed that this view is changing. Canada-US defence relationship is long-standing with NORAD as its foundation, she said. NORAD has facilitated a deeper relationship with over 100+ memorandums of understanding facilitating joint defence of North America. Obviously, however, she noted, there is a big resource and force structure capability gap between the two nations. Dr Charron went on to outline the history of the Canada-US defence relationship. When speaking of today's challenges, she noted that the opening of the North American Arctic could pose a significant security challenge. NORAD and US NORTHCOM are working together more and having regular discussions to adapt to the new challenges, she said. Some new initiatives include the modernisation of the North warning system as a series of long and short radars are coming to their end of life cycle.

29. She continued by stating that a joint Committee is looking at different possibilities of satellite, radar, or other equipment modernisation. NORAD has three main missions: airspace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. The commander of NORAD has always been an US four-star general with a Canadian as the deputy commander. When the commander needs to speak to Canadian officials, they go to the prime minister directly; on the US side there are more barriers between the commander and the US president. As NATO is increasingly forced to interact with a more confrontational Russia today, she noted, there are two *Russias*: one that NATO is very concerned about; but also, the Russia which has been fundamental to forums like the Arctic Council and cooperation in that region. NORAD has been forced to grapple with this challenge. Canada and the United States historically have not wanted NATO to operate in the North American Arctic. Moving forward Canada needs to modernise NORAD to the furthest extent possible, which requires proper investment and analysts to interpret challenges around the world.

IX. Panel discussion on *NATO Deterrence in the East*

- **Lieutenant-Colonel Sean FRENCH, former Commander, EFP battlegroup Latvia, on *Canada's Contribution to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence***
- **Consideration of the draft General Report *Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East* [168 DSC 18 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), General Rapporteur**

30. **Lieutenant-Colonel French** provided a brief overview of the NATO multinational battle group in Latvia. French outlined a few challenges and opportunities and began by showing a video about the command. The video addressed language differences in the battlegroup and the complexity of having eight different nations with many languages. EFP in Latvia is headquartered in Atize, a town north of Riga. The battlegroup is comprised of soldiers from Albania, the Czech Republic, Italy, Canada, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland. Spain has

brought a small engineer company and the Slovenes a reconnaissance platoon. A major part of the mission has been to work closely with three Latvian battalions, with an overriding mission to deter and defend if necessary. LTC French presented some challenges such as interoperability, cultural and technical problems, formatting standard operating procedures, and creating new solutions to problems. He highlighted STRATCOM as being very important for the effectiveness of the battlegroup. Originally there was not supposed to be a division of forces, but ultimately this proved to be necessary. He had operational control for posture management, situational awareness, and strategic communication. French then provided the delegates with an exercise and engagement overview. During exercises, the battlegroup frequently crossed into other nations to prove it was possible, which within the Baltics was very easy due to political will. LTC French noted with pride the battlegroup had seen none of its personnel commit a major crime, it had built and maintained trust in the local community, fostered multinational cohesion, was professional, and fulfilled its mandate with aplomb. Russian narratives and fake news remain a challenge for the battle group, he noted, but it was declining as an issue. He noted, for example, that the Sputnik news agency frequently covered the EFP and presented false claims of fascism, poor behaviour by personnel, NATO's offensive threat to Russians, mispending of funds, and a general distortion of facts. LTC French ended by highlighting the differences between a NATO activity and a NATO operation, stressing that an activity is more limited in scope.

31. **Joseph A. Day** (CA) summarised his report on *Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East* and changes which had been enacted since the last meeting in Warsaw. The draft report, he stated, outlines threats of territorial destabilisation to NATO territory in the East, as well as to strategic partners in the region. The EFP in Poland and the Baltic States is one of the steps taken by NATO in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, he noted, serving as a necessary tripwire deterrence to dissuade Russia from military adventurism. For the Black Sea region, the Tailored Forward Presence provides a flexible and rapid response potential for Allied forces. Senator Day told the delegation that Moscow's readiness for a possible conflict with the West was recently on display during the large-scale Vostok-2018 exercise, in which over 300,000 troops exercised from Siberia to Russia's Far East. China's participation in Vostok further cements the recent strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow, he said. Senator Day then noted that the NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018 was successful in delivering several concrete initiatives to support NATO territories and populations in Eastern Europe. The *NATO Readiness Initiative*, often referred to as 30-30-30-30 Plan, provides for an available pool of common forces for defence and reinforcement. Additionally, he continued, Allies endorsed the *Enablement Plan for SACEUR's Area of Responsibility*, which address challenges of moving personnel and equipment across the Alliance. Military mobility presents a major challenge within the Alliance, Senator Day told the Committee. Deficient and dated infrastructures, as well as cumbersome legal regulations continue to impede rapid movement of forces across the Alliance. Although problems persist, there has been some movement in the right direction, he noted. Senator Day noted he was encouraged by the European Union's recognition of the importance of improving infrastructure and has committed to investment in modernisation. Many of the challenges NATO faces when it comes to military mobility, he continued, are acutely felt in the Suwalki Corridor along the Polish-Lithuanian border. Infrastructural deficiencies, bureaucratic hurdles, and a critical imbalance of forces and equipment leave the region vulnerable to potential Russian interference. NATO must have an effective early warning system, developed infrastructure for quick movement of troops, and the necessary manpower ready to defend the Baltic via the corridor, Senator Day said. NATO was able to demonstrate its ability to mobilise and manoeuvre a sizable force at distance through its recent exercise Trident Juncture 18, he continued. It included 40,000 participants from 29 nations and was a test for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and their ability to operate in intense climatic conditions. Senator Day concluded his presentation by highlighting five important takeaways from the report: the need for the deployment of additional ground forces and equipment in the east; a necessary strengthening of infrastructure and reduction of bureaucratic hurdles to military transfers; improved deployment times through

targeted investments; further investment in air forces, radar and jamming systems to counter Russia's A2/AD systems; and, a strong political commitment to reach the Alliance's defence spending goals.

32. **Roberta Pinotti** (IT) argued that there needs to be a focus on threats from a 360-degree view. She stated that at a future date the Southern Flank must be discussed, and that NATO should not take the threat too lightly. Countries closer to this risk, she continued, must not feel that they are forgotten because of the pivot east. She asked if shifting resources to the Eastern Flank can endanger the Southern Flank.

33. Juozas Olekas supported Joseph A. Day on his very balanced report and underscored that all four EFP countries have reached the 2% benchmark.

34. Madeleine Moon highlighted a couple points from the draft report, noting that paragraph 85 discussed strengthening infrastructure. She noted the recent establishment of a joint German and UK brigade has been established where they will be sharing capabilities. New bridging capabilities are another fantastic step forward. She asked Senator Day how to monitor progress on reducing legal and bureaucratic hurdles in the effort to move people and equipment more efficiently. She asked if there would be a regular update to the Committee whether or not deficiencies have been addressed.

35. Joseph A. Day answered that this particular draft report was intended to focus on the East not take away from other problems. He argued that it is important for parliamentarians to be conscious of that fact just because one issue is being discussed, this does not mean it is subtracting attention to other critical Alliance issues by the Assembly. He also answered that he did not have a firm understanding of the German-UK joint bridging capabilities. Senator Day stated that more needs to be done in monitoring and implementing changes where issues exist.

36. **Andrea Giorgio Felice Orsini** (IT) argued that defending countries on Eastern Flank is a vital duty of NATO. He then went on to state the draft report is not so balanced sufficiently, however, if it does not take into consideration all threats from Russia, which extend beyond the East. Mr Orsini called for more nuances and an overview of the role of the Alliance, its relations with Russia and threats in general. Michael R. Turner pointed out that reports on threats in the South can be found on the NATO PA's website.

37. Joao Rebelo stated that the Sub-Committee went to Portugal and Spain where it addressed problems from the South. He agreed with the Italian delegation on the point about challenges from the South. He brought up a recent Rand Cooperation report that states Russian forces could overwhelm Baltics in two weeks. Mr Rebelo then asked about EFP and the number and nature of contacts with Russian forces in the region. **Marko Mihkelson** (EE) stated that the EFP is a very important learning process for the Baltics and Poland and it makes NATO's presence in the Baltics very visible and generally supported by the population. There are many challenges facing NATO including in the South, he continued, which we all seek to understand and address. For example, he stated, the largest operational deployment for Estonia now is in Mali. He asked what more should countries do to make deterrence visible.

38. Kamil Aydin raised the plight of the Crimean Tatars following the annexation of Crimea. He asked what else NATO could do to deter Russia in the Black Sea Region.

39. LTC French said he could only comment on Latvia. He stated that there is very low contact with Russian forces and it is mostly handled by the Latvians. He did witness more interest from Russia during NATO's active periods, but nothing was viewed as provocative and it was handled well by Latvia.

40. Joseph Day noted his appreciation of the support for the report. He said NATO cannot match the significant number of troops Russia has on the border in the Baltic region, but he did say that the EFP has well-equipped and well-trained troops ready to be the front line forces in the event of a contingency. The Suwalki Corridor, he acknowledged, is critical to defend to allow for easy movement of troops. Mali is another example of NATO working outside traditional area, in an effort to prevent problems from spreading.

41. **The draft Report [168 DSC 18 E] was adopted unanimously.**

X. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation *Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era* [170 DSCTC 18 E] by Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary), Rapporteur

42. **Attila Mesterhazy** (HU) presented his draft report on *Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era*. He began by noting the Alliance has adapted its force posture and policies significantly in recent years to take on new challenges coming from the East and South. As the report title aptly notes, he stated, there are new commitments in a new era, and he urged all Allies to recognise the necessity of sharing the burden of these efforts. He reminded Committee members that every Allied head of State of Government committed to the Defence Investment Pledge at the 2014 Wales Summit. He continued by saying there is pressure on all Allies today to submit credible national plans demonstrating their path forward to allocate at least 2% of their nation's GDP by 2024 to defence, and at least 20% of this increased defence spending toward new equipment purchases, to include research and development. Mr Mesterhazy noted there have now been four consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure in NATO Europe and Canada. More than half of NATO Allies, he said, are spending the target of 20% on new equipment and R&D. The resource intensive nature of new NATO missions requires substantial investment from members, he continued. The United States is redoubling its investment in European security via the European Deterrence Initiative with USD 6.5 billion to be spent in 2019, which is USD 3.1 billion more than in 2017. He said it is also encouraging to see non-US Allies doing more. Mr Mesterhazy told the delegation that the economic recovery underway across the Alliance has seen non-US Allies underwrite an additional USD 87 billion in defence spending. He said increased efforts for more efficient and effective defence industrial cooperation across the Alliance will go a long way to help address many of today's burden sharing concerns, bemoaning the fact that duplications and subsidisation continued to cost NATO's European member states anywhere from EUR 25 to 100 billion each year. Mr Mesterhay concluded his remarks by stating that as NATO HQ pushes the *cash, commitment, and capabilities* message when it comes to burden sharing three key ideas should be at the forefront of NATO parliamentarian's minds: 1) you must have inputs to have outputs; 2) Political commitment is not only necessary to make increased defence funding available, but also to sustain it; and, 3) the combination of the two should be focused on the acquisition of the capabilities necessary to address the security challenges in the Alliance. Finally, he said, members should consider the 3% criterion, where 2% are allocated toward defence and 1% targets some of the longer-term variables, such as extreme poverty, which can be disruptive and have a broader and sustaining impact on global peace and security.

43. **Brett Guthrie** (US) underscored the strong bipartisan support for NATO. He noted the central role of the US Congress in making NATO-related decisions. This is clear in all the funding the House has approved for increased US presence in Europe, he said. For the future of the Alliance, he noted, it is essential NATO invests in effective capabilities. Outputs are impossible without inputs, he told the delegation, and if Allies do not meet the modest goals set out at the Wales Summit, NATO will not have the ability to discuss what new efforts and capabilities in which to invest.

44. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem drew attention to paragraph 79 which refers to recent reports on the state of state of land, air, sea forces in Germany. Investment will do nothing unless it includes good maintenance, he said. For example, he noted, during the First Gulf War, the United Kingdom had to cannibalise several tank divisions in order to have one operational division. Lord Campbell also commented on the less political tone of the report than earlier. He referred to paragraphs 95 and 96, noting it is important to realise that security is not just to be found in bombs, bullets and equipment; indeed there are also many objectives which will have a security outcome; and that is why he strongly supports the recommendation of the 3% benchmark.

45. Andreas Loverdos drew attention to paragraph 71 of the report and commented on how his country has reached the 2% and 20% marks. He asked the Rapporteur to look at the Greek figures. He felt that paragraph 71 had been worsened since an earlier version. He proposed removing paragraph 71, or adding an asterisk or parenthesis including his clarification. Attila Mesterhazy supported the comments from the United States. Mr Mesterhazy also noted he was ready to accept comments from Greece to clarify paragraph 71.

46. **Lorinc Nacsa** (HU) stated that President Trump has been pressing along the lines of this report very hard. His insistence on this subject has been critical, he said, and, as a result, Europe is pulling itself together. Hungary adopted a new national plan to meet expenditure goals. Mr Nacsa state that the EU dimension is crucial, especially how it will develop and harmonise with NATO. He highlighted regional relations as important and stated Central and Eastern Europe countries should be more involved.

47. **Fikri Isik** (TR) said he would like to correct a factual mistake in the draft report. In paragraph 26 he believed there was a misunderstanding over how the Turkish defence budget is broken down. Turkey only reports defence spending to NATO, not security, he said. In the report, the Turkish budget covers not only defence but also the security budget. He recommended deleting the relevant sentence. Juozas Olekas recommended improving the language of the text in paragraph 88. Attila Mesterhazy stressed that the report is not a PR exercise. He would like to outline a credible plan which takes issues step by step. He promised to check the numbers with the Turkish colleague.

48. **The draft Report [170 DSCTC 18 E] was adopted.**

XI. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities by Joao REBELO (Portugal), Chairperson of the Sub-Committee

49. Joao Rebelo discussed the planned programme of the DSCFC for 2019. He detailed proposed visits to China and Jordan. In 2019, he noted, the Sub-Committee would seek to engage with the impact the Pacific may have on global security and then to better understand NATO's recent efforts to cooperate more closely with Jordan.

XII. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation by Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTENWEEM (United Kingdom), Chairperson of the Sub-Committee

50. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem discussed the joint visit with the STC to Canada in line with NATO's *Cutlass Fury Exercise*. He also noted a Joint CDS DG visit to Iceland and Sweden late April/early May.

51. **Meeting adjourned by Michael R. Turner.**

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52. Vice Chairman Loverdos started the meeting at 9:11 explaining the schedule for the day and stated that the day could end by 12:30, if the Committee was able to complete its agenda on time. He then gave the floor to Madeleine Moon to present her draft report.

XIII. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities *NATO Special Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment* [169 DSCFC 18 E] by Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom), Rapporteur

53. Madeleine Moon presented her draft report on *NATO Special Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment*. Ms Moon began her report by noting that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are seen as a key element of the defence, deterrence, and situational awareness needed by Allies facing an increasingly broad spectrum of security challenges facing NATO today. Outside larger NATO militaries, such as the United States, United Kingdom and France, Allies such as Spain, Norway, and Lithuania are also moving to invest seriously in their Special Forces. If properly resourced and trained, capable Allied Special Operations Forces can be an effective tool to parry sub-Article 5 attempts to coerce, undermine, or compel foes. She said her research indicates that most Allied Special Forces are still neither large enough nor sufficiently resourced to accomplish the accelerating pace of tasks assigned to them, particularly those requiring strategic reach outside of Europe. Therefore, she continued, parliamentary attention to the allocation of adequate funding to make national Special Forces fit for purpose in today's international security environment is essential if the Alliance is going to be able to remedy this problem. Parliamentarians need to think about the role and use of SOF, and if we are going to continue to rely on them for such a large range of tasks from direct action to train, advice and assist missions to time intensive intelligence. The increased demand for our nations' Special Forces' services is straining their ability to fill their ranks with qualified soldiers. An important finding of Moon's research into Allied Special Forces is the need for increased regionalisation of Allied Special component commands. Regionalisation provides clear benefits by allowing for expanded situational awareness capacity, which could translate into speed and accuracy of response. This would also add resilience and strength to the Alliance's new defence and deterrence posture, she concluded. Coordinated SOF would be a real contribution to all of our desires to have a 360-degree security posture. She concluded her presentation by posing three main questions she derived from the draft report: when assessing Allied conventional defence posture, what kind of understanding is driving this beyond a basic balance of forces assessment? Does the Alliance have capable, able and adaptable forces available, on a regular basis to deal with a Ukraine-like attack on our countries? Can the Alliance afford to delay putting in place the regional structures necessary to provide the responses required?

54. Bob Stewart said he believes that if women are in Special Forces then they should train at the same pace and time as men. Women may not be as robust, but they have other qualities necessary to a complete and competent national SOF. He expressed scepticism, however, over how increased Special Forces could counter the threat of offensive actions such as Ukraine. Madeleine Moon agreed that women should train in the same pace and timing as men. She stressed that Special Forces cannot replace traditional forces. Special Forces must be ready and well equipped, so they can meet any challenge.

55. Kamil Aydin stated that emphasis should be placed on all terrorist groups including the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In January former US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter confirmed links between the Kurdish militia groups, PKK and People's Protection Units (YPG).

He argued that NATO must take into consideration all groups without consideration of ideology. Another issue he raised was the misuse of some Islamic concepts. Aydin argued that the term Jihadi should be stricken from the report because it carries multiple meanings in Islam. Madeleine Moon was happy to alter language to address sensitivities and requested alternative terms from the Turkish delegate.

56. Juozas Olekas celebrated 10 years of Lithuanian Special Forces, which have been highly valued in Afghanistan. Olekas discussed military capabilities and structures for actions like in Ukraine. Importantly, he asked if there is enough flexible will and mechanism to act with special forces in a political sense. Madeleine Moon stated that the NATO PA is the political will. One of the reasons for being part of the NATO PA is that delegates are the eyes and ears of individual countries. She agreed that capabilities do not matter in the absence of political will.

57. Joao Rebelo asked for elaboration on the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). He asked why it was running at 70% staffing and what steps could be taken to improve how NSHQ works. He also inquired about data on recruitment for Special Forces. He asked if it was difficult to find young Special Forces soldiers and whether other countries are facing similar problems. Madeleine Moon pointed out that getting accurate data about training figures is difficult. However, all NATO members are facing recruitment crises. It is necessary to explain the vital role of Special Forces and encourage young people to face those challenges. She argued countries should foster more national pride and encourage people to come forward and take the mental and physically challenging role of being in their nations' Special Forces. On the question of understaffing at NSHQ, she said this is a problem that can be resolved by parliamentarians, because it is their responsibility to provide the necessary resources.

58. **Koryun Nahapetyan (AM)** asked about how technological advances will replace some of the need for conventional forces in NATO armed forces. He asked how this will impact NATO SOF capabilities. Madeleine Moon stated that for any military to be effective, intelligence and situational awareness are necessary. Changing technology is an area where NATO is showing weakness. Ms Moon supported the idea of using technology to resolve this difficultly because it have the capabilities to keep us safe and secure. This allows conventional forces to operate efficiently and effectively, she concluded.

59. **The draft Report [169 DSCFC 18 E] was adopted.**

XIV. Presentation by Dr Peter BROOKES, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs, The Heritage Foundation on *The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and its Future*

60. **Dr Peter Brookes** presented on *The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and its Future*, focusing mainly on Russian violations of the treaty and the rising threat of Chinese aggression in East Asia. He underscored that his opinions were solely his own and not those of the Heritage Foundation. Signed in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, the INF Treaty was groundbreaking for its elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely shorter and medium range missiles and the complete elimination of all mobile missile launchers. This treaty however only applied to land-based systems, not air or sea. The treaty has been significantly challenged since 2008 with Russia's advancement of the Novator 9M729 also known as the SSC-8. Russia has tried to counter that the United States violated the INF Treaty via the installation of Aegis Ashore missile defence systems in Poland and Romania, which they state can be converted to have offensive capabilities. Dr Brookes noted this is a hypothetical argument from Russia meant to distract from their own violations of the treaty. China is a major

concern for the United States as it reassesses the state of the INF Treaty, Dr Brookes continued, as Beijing is not party to the INF Treaty. The US and Russia are banned from intermediate missiles, he continued, while nearly 95% of China's current missile arsenal would violate the treaty. This threatens US interests in the Pacific in areas such as in the South China Sea. The INF prevents the United States from deploying the US military to the fullest extent possible in an effort to shape Chinese behaviour. It is unclear if China would be willing to be party to the treaty. The challenges from China and Russia must be answered in some way. Failing to react would further embolden China and create vulnerabilities to the US and its allies in the region. The United States has good reason to leave the treaty, but this topic should be debated more. He concluded his presentation by stating that inaction, however, is not an option.

61. Bob Stewart was concerned that NATO is not as effective as it should be in deterrence and is experiencing a gap in the escalation ladder. Because the United States does not have INF missiles, its deterrence strategy is affected. Stewart understood why the United States might abandon the treaty. He inquired about deterrence in a new era, asking if parliamentarians should look to the Cold War academics like McNamara or Herman Kahn for clues on how to move forward. Peter Brookes argued that deterrence goes far beyond missiles today and includes cyber, space domain and the hybrid dimension. Russia and China can hold all US satellites at risk. This is an Achilles Heel in the opening days of a conflict. The deployment of S-M3s, Tomahawk missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and the construction of artificial island in the Pacific along with the development of hypersonic missiles were inconceivable when the treaty was signed. In this way arms control treaties can be outpaced by technology.

62. Joao Rebelo asked about the credibility of the quality of China's nuclear missiles. He asked whether the missiles are being used only as deterrence or if they should be viewed as credible threats. He stated that if he understood the problem well, the US and NATO have no other options than to call into question the INF Treaty. He said he understood that China and Russia will not back down. He asked if INF Treaty should be thrown out or renegotiated if it no longer serves NATO. Peter Brookes spoke of Admiral Davidson, who gave a recent lecture on Chinese forces in the Pacific, in which he underscored the high quality of Chinese platforms and investment in AI, hypersonic missiles, space/counter space, and ballistic missiles. China boasts one of the largest missile systems in the world today, he said. It has grown at double digit numbers for decades. Its arsenal includes stealth fighters, one aircraft carrier at sea and another under construction. Additionally, it is building new army with non-commissioned officers. Dr Brookes then detailed more Chinese developments in missile technology from Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology to more mobile weapon systems. He argued that China's nuclear doctrine remains in flux and is unlikely to sign on to Western lead nuclear treaties. Dr Brookes then suggested some ways to amend the INF to deal with the Chinese threat, such as limiting it only the Europe or creating a global ban.

63. **Franklin van Kappen** (NL) stated that Russia is a spent force and China is not. On the topic of the INF, maritime and air assets are not included, so this could be a way to counter Russian ground-based systems. In the Pacific it is a different story, where countering missiles is not as easy as in Europe. The United States has an advantage but it is clearly threatened by China. **John Spellar** (UK) agreed that Russia is in violation of INF treaty but wondered if pointing out these violations could serve as a propaganda tool for Russia. Dr Brookes agreed with Mr van Kappen's statement. China previously promised not to militarise the islands it was constructing in the South China Sea, but they have broken this promise since their construction. China is claiming the South China Sea as an integral part of China and defending this territory with surface-to-air missiles. This is counter to international treaties and the claims of six other nations. In the long-term Brookes noted he does not see China and Russia as natural allies. China has tremendous ambitions to replace the US in the Pacific. There are significant differences between Russia and China despite cooperation with Vostok-2018

Exercise. Russia has supported China over Taiwan and in the South China Sea, but fundamental differences in worldview and economic potential cannot be papered over. Dr Brookes argued that the United States has not done a good job at dealing with this issue. The Obama Administration did not advance the issue effectively. In contrast, the Trump Administration decided what they had to do and got the Russian's intentions. As a result, Russians have sent all sorts of signals. Vice President Pence and President Putin have discussed a potential G20 meeting between Trump and Putin where it will be discussed further. The Russians frequently talk about an arms race for propaganda purposed and have said in the past that they are concerned about missile development in China.

64. Madeleine Moon asked about Chinese purchases of strategic infrastructure and banks in Europe. She asked if this new influence should be considered a hybrid threat. Dr Brookes expressed tremendous concerns for Europe coming from China. He noted, however, that the threat is more acute in Asia. China wants to change the power structure there, which is a major security concern for the United States.

65. Andreas Loverdos thanked Dr Brookes for his presentation and for delegates' inputs.

XV. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution *Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era* [217 DSC 18 E] by Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary), Rapporteur

66. The Committee commenced with the consideration of the amendments on the draft resolution on *Burden Sharing: New Commitments in a New Era* [217 DSC 18 E]. The Chairman asked for everyone's cooperation in completing all agenda items and closing the meeting before lunch. Vice Chairperson Loverdos then introduced each amendment, asked the author to defend the proposed changes, and lead the Committee in a vote on each amendment of the resolution.

67. In paragraph 9 of the resolution, which concerned reaching the 2% GDP spending benchmark for defence, delegates Mr Lamers (DE), Mr Thiery (BE), and Mr Tarno (ES) attempted to soften the language of the text to be closer to what was agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. Rick Larsen (US) and Attila Mesterhazy (HU) argued against these proposed changes and thought the language reflected what the NATO PA was attempting to achieve in terms of advocating for higher defence expenditures. The amendment was voted on and approved by a majority of the delegates. With the adoption of the German amendment one of the Spanish amendments and another Belgian amendment were withdrawn. Amendment No. 2 from Spain discussing capabilities and commitment was voted on and approved by a majority.

68. Some amendments concerned the language of the text. Mr Mesterhazy accepted the German Amendment 6 on replacing the words "reach the 2% benchmark" with "move towards the 2% guideline." As a result of the adoption of this amendment Mr Thiery withdrew Amendment 11 and Mr Lamers withdrew Amendment 5. Mr Mesterhazy rejected Mr Chitac's (RO) Amendment 8 on inserting the word "multiannual" after "credible" because it made the text repetitive. Mr Connolly (US) withdrew Amendment 3 because it was resolved in another paragraph. With Mr Connolly's Amendment 4, which concerned inserting a subparagraph about meeting defence spending commitment, Mr Mesterhazy accepted the amendment.

69. **The draft Resolution [217 DSC 18 E] was adopted as amended**, with only one delegate voting against.

XVI. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution *Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East* [218 DSC 18 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), Rapporteur

70. The Committee then continued with the draft resolution on *Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East* [218 DSC 18 E], which flows from the report presented by Joseph Day the previous day. Senator Day led the review of each amendment and subsequent votes.

71. Amendments 1-3, 5-8, 10-15, 17-18, 21-22 were all accepted by Senator Day and added to the resolution. Most dealt with small language adjustments of the document or added greater emphasis to specific concerns in the east, such as Russian aggression toward Georgia. Amendments 4, 9, and 23 were all withdrawn by their respective countries. Amendment 19 proposed by Mr Chitac sought to draw greater focus to the Southern Flank. Senator Day rejected the amendment as being outside the scope of the report and the proposal was ultimately turned down by vote. Similarly, Amendment 20 sought to remove the qualifier "enhanced" before the words "forward presence". Day rejected this proposal and Mr Chitac agreed to remove the amendment. Finally, Amendment 16, which sought to increase the length of time military vessels are in the Sea of Azov was rejected by Senator Day for being concerned more with tactics over principles. Senator Day abstained from the vote on the Amendment, which was ultimately rejected by the delegates.

72. **The draft Resolution [218 DSC 18 E] was voted upon and adopted as amended.**

XVII. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee officers

73. The Committee re-elected **Michael R. Turner (US)** as **Chairperson of the Committee**. The body subsequently elected **Paul Cook (US)** as **Vice-Chair**, **Attila Mesterhazy (HU)** as **Chairperson of Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation**, **Rick Larsen (US)** and **Frank van Kappen (NL)** as **Vice-Chairpersons of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation**. **Nicholas Soames (UK)** was approved as **Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation** and **Rob Bishop (US)** is voted **Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities**. In a contested election for **Rapporteur on Future Security and Defence Capabilities**, **Lara Martinho (PT)** narrowly defeated Wolfgang Hellmich (DE) by a vote of 19-17.

XVIII. Any other business

74. No other business.

XIX. Date and place of next meeting

75. The Vice Chairperson announced the next meeting of the Defence and Security Committee as taking place in February 2019 in Brussels. The Spring Session is scheduled for May 2019 in Bratislava, Slovakia.

XX. Closing remarks

76. Mr Loverdos thanked everyone for their constructive participation and expressed gratitude toward guest speakers, visitors, and the host nation. Finally, he thanked the

interpreters, DSC Director Ethan Corbin, DSC Coordinator Jailee Rychen and minute writer William Persing.
